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Injunction and granted Unisys1 Motion to Dismiss. Olds timely 
appealed that Order and seeks a remand with instructions to the 
District Court. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On July 30, 1987, Olds filed an action to enjoin Unisys 
from altering a building which Unisys occupied under a lease from 
Olds. R.I-1 to 7.-' The trial court granted Olds a temporary 
restraining order and ordered Unisys to show cause why a prelimi-
nary injunction should not issue. R.1-105. Unisys then filed a 
motion to dismiss the action. The court held a non-evidentiary 
hearing on August 24, 1987 and an evidentiary hearing on Septem-
ber 28, 1987. 
The trial court found that in the course of the lease-
hold Unisys had transformed the building from a warehouse to a 
high-technology manufacturing facility. Tr.11-116. The court 
also found that Unisys was removing permanently-affixed walls 
from the building, causing damage to Olds' property. _Id. The 
court held, however, that Unisys1 actions did not violate the 
lease agreements as Olds claimed. Tr.11-116 to 120. The court 
i/ The two volumes of the Record on Appeal, as paginated by the 
District Court Clerk, are designated R.I and R.II respec-
tively; the transcripts of the two hearings are designated 
Tr.I and Tr.II. References in the brief are to Volume fol-
lowed by page number. 
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granted the Motion to Dismiss and denied Olds1 Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction. 
After the court's oral ruling dismissing the action, 
Unisys filed a counterclaim. On March 17f 1988, the trial court 
entered an order dismissing Unisys' counterclaim, whereupon its 
earlier order dismissing the action became a final order. Olds 
timely filed its notice of appeal on April 15, 1988. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 16, 1964, Deshon Properties Corporation, as 
lessor ("Deshon"), entered into a lease (the "Original Lease") 
with General Motors Corporation, as lessee, for a building 
located in Davis County, Utah (the "Premises"). Exhibit P-l. On 
December 20, 1972, General Motors entered into a sublease (the 
"Sublease") for the Premises with Unisys's predecessor in inter-
est, Sperry Rand Corporation (Unisys and its predecessors in 
interest are referred to as "Unisys" or "Tenant"). Exhibit P-2. 
As a result of transactions occurring between 1974 and March 
1986, Olds acquired the interests of both Deshon and General 
Motors in the Premises. Tr.11-47 to 49. 
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Unisys, on December 4, 1984, executed a Tenant Estoppel 
2/ 
Certification and Attornment (the "Attornment"). Exhibit P-4.-7 
The Attornment provided, inter alia, that the Sublease would con-
tinue as the lease between the parties, except that provisions of 
the Original Lease which did not diminish the Tenant's obliga-
tions or the Landlord's rights under the Sublease would be incor-
porated into the Sublease. Ld. The Lease, the Sublease and the 
Attornment (collectively, the "Lease Documents") provide the 
framework governing the relationship between Olds, as Landlord, 
and Unisys, as Tenant. 
Although Unisys' lease term does not expire until March 
31, 1989, in late 1986, Unisys reduced its manufacturing opera-
tion at the Premises and began to make substantial alterations to 
the Premises. Exhibits P-2 and P-6. Olds filed this action to 
enjoin Unisys from destroying alterations Unisys had made to the 
Premises. Olds alleged, pursuant to the Lease Documents, that 
Unisys has no right to destroy permanent improvements affixed to 
the Property without first obtaining Olds' written consent. 
Unisys is engaged in substantial alterations of the 
Premises, including the demolition and removal of permanent 
2/ Attornment agreements are routinely employed in such circum-
stances to acknowledge the tenant's recognition of its obli-
gation to the new landlord. 
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walls, suspended ceiling panels, light fixtures and shelving. 
Tr.11-91 to 103. By removing certain improvements (those 
installed by Unisys in the process of transforming the Premises 
to a high-tech facility) Unisys is causing permanent damage to 
the Premises. Id. For instance, the trial court found that 
removal of walls by Unisys was damaging the Premises. Tr.11-116. 
Olds1 claim is based on unambiguous language in the 
first clause of Paragraph 21 of the Sublease (the "Alterations 
Clause"). The Alterations Clause states that "Lessee will not 
make any alterations or add any construction whatsoever to the 
premises without the prior written consent of the Lessor, and in 
each instance, such a request for consent shall include a set of 
plans, specifications and cost of any contemplated improve-
ment...." Exhibit P-2, Addendum A. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled 
that the Tenant was not required to seek approval for its actions 
because it was "restoring" the building pursuant to other provi-
sions of the Lease Documents. Tr.11-117. The court relied upon 
the second clause of Paragraph 21 of the Sublease (the "Restora-
tion Clause"), which states that: 
[I]f the lessee makes any alterations or adds any con-
struction, such additional construction or alterations 
shall be removed at the expiration of the term and the 
premises shall be restored at the sole expense of the 
Lessee to the condition existing prior to Lessee's tak-
ing possession, except for improvements of the 
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following nature which shall remain on the premises at 
the time Lessee vacates the premises: ... [enumerated 
list of exceptions]. 
Exhibit P-2, Addendum A. 
The trial court had in evidence Unisys' own written 
interpretation of the Restoration Clause which reflected the par-
ties' mutual understanding that Olds could waive Unisys' obliga-
tion to restore. Unisys had in fact written to Olds in contem-
plation of terminating the lease and had affirmed the "landlord's 
right to waive" and Olds' option to "waive that paragraph and 
accept all the improvements provided by [Unisys]." Exhibit P-6, 
Addendum B. The trial court held that evidence of the parties' 
mutual understanding of Olds' right to waive was immaterial. 
Tr.11-54 to 63, Addendum C. Thus, Olds was denied its contrac-
tual right under the Alterations Clause or as implied from the 
Restoration Clause to obtain written notice of Unisys' alteration 
plans — the basis by which Olds might determine whether to 
enforce or waive the restoration requirement. 
Olds attempted repeatedly at the hearing to introduce 
additional evidence proving the consistent recognition by Unisys 
that Olds could choose to waive the Restoration Clause and that 
the clause was intended to benefit the Landlord. But the trial 
court disallowed introduction of any further evidence offered on 
this point. Id. Course-of-performance evidence was excluded not 
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only because the court characterized it as immaterial, but also 
because the court allotted very limited time to the evidentiary 
hearing. Tr.11-103 to 105. 
The trial court also held that Section 10.02 of the 
Original Lease granted Unisys the right to remove permanent 
walls, ceilings and other improvements. Tr.11-118. The Original 
Lease states that: 
It is understood and agreed that the Lessee, from time 
to time during the term of this Lease or any extension 
thereof, may install machinery, equipment and fixtures 
of various kinds and description for the purpose of 
carrying on its business, and upon any of such machin-
ery, equipment and fixtures being so installed in or 
placed on the leased premises by the Lessee the same 
shall remain at all times the property of the Lessee, 
and, at any time during the term or any extension or 
extensions thereof, and at the termination of the Lease 
or any extension or extensions thereof, the Lessee 
shall be entitled to remove any and all of such machin-
ery, equipment and fixtures; provided, however, that if 
any machinery and equipment is so attached to any 
building or buildings so as not to be readily removable 
without damage to the building or buildings, then, in 
such event, if the Lessee shall remove the same, the 
Lessee shall promptly repair and replace any damage 
caused to the building or buildings by such removal. 
Section 10.02, Exhibit P-l, Addendum D (emphasis added). 
However, by the terms of the Attornment, Section 10.02, 
as a pro-Tenant provision of the Original Lease, was not incorpo-
rated into the Sublease. Exhibit P-4, Addendum E. By citing 
Section 10.02 in reaching its conclusion, the court misinter-
preted the Attornment, which by its terms incorporates into the 
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Sublease only those elements of the Original Lease that favor the 
Landlord. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Sublease requires Unisys to obtain Olds1 prior 
written consent before making any alteration to the Premises. 
Although the Sublease also requires Unisys to remove its altera-
tions and restore the Premises at the termination of the lease, 
that Restoration Clause is for the Landlord's benefit. A party 
can waive a provision that is for its benefit. Furthermore, the 
written communication between the parties shows their mutual 
understanding that Olds could waive the Restoration Clause. In 
contravention of those Sublease provisions, the trial court's 
ruling permits Unisys to alter and damage the Premises without 
Olds1 permission. 
Courts hearing preliminary injunction motions must con-
sider all relevant evidence bearing on the propriety of the 
injunction sought. The court cannot properly exercise its dis-
cretion whether to grant or deny an injunction without consider-
ing all of the relevant evidence necessary to establish harm and 
the likelihood of success on the merits. Since the trial court 
found the necessary harm to Olds1 property, only evidence of 
Olds' likelihood of success on the legal issues was necessary for 
the entry of an injunction. Yet the court refused to consider 
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proffered evidence on the most important legal issue: the par-
ties1 mutual understanding of Olds1 right to waive the Restora-
tion Clause. 
The excluded evidence would have further substantiated 
Unisys1 acceptance of Olds1 right to relieve Unisys of its obli-
gation to remove permanently attached improvements made to the 
Premises. Under Utah lawf the parties' performance and construc-
tion of a contract term determines the meaning of that term. The 
trial court's refusal to admit such material evidence prevented 
Olds from receiving a fair hearing. 
The trial court also ignored the effect of the 
Attornment on the Original Lease and the Sublease. The 
Attornment makes the Sublease the governing instrument and incor-
porates only those provisions of the Original Lease which do not 
diminish the Landlord's rights. Because Section 10.02 of the 
Original Lease "entitled" the Tenant to remove fixturesf it was a 
pro-Tenant provision diminishing the Landlord's right under the 
Sublease to elect whether to impose a duty to restore. Section 
10.02 is therefore not incorporated into the Sublease. Neverthe-
less the trial court ruled that Section 10.02 afforded Unisys the 
right to destroy permanently attached improvements, implicitly 
ignoring the effect of the Attornment. 
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The trial court erred in interpreting the Restoration 
Clause of the Sublease, in interpreting the written course-of-
performance evidence about waiver, and in interpreting the 
Attornment. The trial court also committed reversible error by 
excluding additional course-of-performance evidence. Since 
injury was established, Olds is entitled to an order reversing 
the holding of the trial court and remanding the action for entry 
of the injunction. At the very least, the matter should be 
remanded for a new hearing consistent with this Court's ruling 
(1) that Unisys has no right to alter the Premises without Olds1 
permission, (2) that Unisys conceded Olds1 right to waive the 
Restoration Clause by its letter of acknowledgement and that Olds 
was therefore entitled to waive restoration of the Premises and 
to keep the improvements, (3) that all course-of-performance evi-
dence should be admitted, and (4) that the Attornment obviated 
any right to remove fixtures contained in Section 10.02 of the 
Original Lease. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE RESTORATION CLAUSE 
A. Olds Can Waive the Restoration Clause Because the Pro-
vision is for Olds' Benefit 
The Sublease requires Unisys to seek permission for 
alterations and to restore the Premises at termination of the 
-10-
lease. The provision is worded as a Tenant duty (". . . the 
premises shall be restored at the sole expense of the Lessee 
. . . .") and exists for the Landlord's benefit. Although the 
Landlord might permit alterations useful to the Tenant during the 
term of the lease, the Restoration Clause allows the Landlord to 
compel the Tenant to restore the Premises to its original condi-
tion or to accept the changes if the Landlord deems them useful. 
The Alterations Clause, by requiring the Tenant to seek the 
Landlord's written permission before making alterations, provides 
the mechanism by which the Landlord can intelligently exercise 
his choice. Alternatively, the Restoration Clause itself implies 
the Landlord's right to know the Tenant's plans so that the Land-
lord can decide whether to waive or enforce restoration. 
General principles of law permit a party to waive con-
tract provisions included for that party's benefit. Pruitt v. 
Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1984). Accordingly, Olds is 
entitled to waive the Restoration Clause. Such a waiver need not 
even be expressly declared by the party, but may be implied from 
the party's conduct. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Electric Smith Con-
struction and Equipment Co., 483 P.2d 880, 883 (Wash. App. 1971). 
Certainly by seeking a preliminary injunction, Olds engaged in 
conduct consistent with its right to waive. Olds sought a 
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preliminary injunction in order to force Unisys to supply the 
information necessary for Olds to intelligently exercise its 
rights. 
B. Olds Can Waive the Restoration Clause Because Both Olds 
and Unisys Interpreted the Clause to Permit Waiver 
Unisys recognized Olds1 right to waive the Restoration 
Clause in its letter that invited Olds to waive and to keep all 
improvements. The letter sets forth the parties1 mutual lease 
interpretation that should be enforced by this Court. 
Under Utah law, courts are to consider the way the par-
ties have construed their contract and the way the parties have 
performed as evidence of the true meaning of the contract. For 
example, in Zeese v. Estate of Siqel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 
1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that a Landlord's acquiescence 
in a Tenant's use establishes the meaning the court should 
enforce. The Court stated: "The parties, by their action and 
performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent; 
the contract should be so enforced by the courts." Id. 
Likewise, Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 
1190, 1195 (Utah 1981), held that the parties1 course of dealing 
should be examined to determine their intentions. In Eie, plain-
tiffs alleged that the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic 
evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the agreement. The 
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Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding: fl[T]hough argua-
bly clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate by their 
actions, that to them the contract means something quite differ-
ent, the intent of the parties will be enforced." Ld. at 1195. 
See also, Builough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308, 400 P.2d 20, 23 
(1965); Hardinqe Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 323, 266 P.2d 
494, 496 (1954). 
While this rule is restricted to contracts deemed 
ambiguous, the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
The question becomes ambiguous to whom? 
Where the parties had demonstrated by their actions and 
performance that to them the contract meant something 
quite different, the meaning and intent of the parties 
should be enforced. In such a situation, the parties 
by their actions have created the ambiguity to bring 
the rule into operation. If this were not the rule, 
the courts would be enforcing one contract when both 
parties have demonstrated that they meant and intended 
the contract to be quite different. 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 
266, 271 (1972) (emphasis added). 
Despite this clear axiom of contract construction, the 
trial court held that the evidence of the consistent interpreta-
tion given to the Restoration Clause by both Unisys and Olds was 
immaterial. Tr.11-58 to 63. This evidence would have demon-
strated that Unisys always understood that the Restoration Clause 
of the Sublease was inserted for the Landlord's benefit. Unisys1 
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Real Estate Manager told Olds' Chief Executive as recently as 
October 27, 1986 that the Landlord had the option to "waive the 
paragraph and accept all the improvements provided by Sperry." 
Exhibit P-6 (emphasis added). Additional evidence not admitted 
at the hearing was proffered to substantiate this view. Tr.11-58 
to 63. 
Olds offered evidence that Unisys repeatedly conceded 
Olds1 right to waive the Restoration Clause and to relieve Unisys 
from its obligation to restore the Premises. Yet at the hearing, 
the trial court rebuffed all attempts by Olds' counsel to intro-
duce this relevant evidence. When Olds' counsel attempted to 
cite Utah law on course of performance, the trial court summarily 
rejected the evidence. The following dialogue indicates the 
court's view that the current litigation between the parties 
negated any prior common understanding of the contract meaning: 
MR.BLACK: 
[Olds' Counsel]: Now, . . . the Utah Supreme 
Court, on numerous occasions, 
stated that when the parties 
arrived at a construction or 
interpretation of the docu-
ments, that is the construc-
tion interpretation that will 
be given the document and I 
would be happy to cite cases 
on it. 
THE COURT: No. You can't honestly tell 
me the parties agreed on the 
construction of any paragraph 
in this case, can you? 
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MR.BLACK: 
THE COURT: 
MR.WANGSGARD 
[Unisysf Counsel]: 
THE COURT: 
MR.BLACK: 
MR.WANGSGARD: 
THE COURT: 
I think that we can because I 
think there's additional 
correspondence. 
Let me ask Counsel. Is he 
speaking for you? 
He certainly is not, your 
Honor. 
I know he can't be speaking 
for him because I read the 
documents, too. 
I think this shows that the 
parties had an understanding 
of what the agreement was. 
It's just immaterial. 
The court will sustain the 
objection. 
Tr.11-59 to 60. 
The court apparently concluded that since the parties 
currently disagree over the proper construction of their con-
tract, evidence showing a past common understanding was not rele-
vant. In every lawsuit involving a current disagreement over 
contract terms, uncontroverted evidence of past agreement as to 
these terms is the best evidence of what those terms mean. 
Unisys' counsel did not offer any evidence to controvert Unisys' 
prior acknowledgement that Olds could waive restoration; he sim-
ply asserted that all evidence of that acknowledgement was 
immaterial: 
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MR.BLACK: Did he [Mr. Maguire] state to 
you that Olds Properties could 
waive the restoration clause 
of the sublease? 
MR.WANGSGARD: Objection. Immaterial. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
MR.BLACK: Immaterial as to whether they 
thought that they could waive 
restoration? That's the pre-
cise issue before the Court, 
your Honor. 
Tr.11-62 to 63. 
The district court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss 
was based on the court's erroneous construction of the text of 
the Restoration Clause and its failure to recognize the signifi-
cance of the letter acknowledging Olds' right to waive Unisys' 
obligation to remove improvements. Utah law establishes that the 
parties' course of action is the best evidence of the meaning of 
the lease terms. Zeese, 534 P.2d at 90. The trial court erred 
in holding this evidence immaterial and in ignoring Unisys' 
admission contained in Exhibit P-6. 
C. The Appellate Court Reviews Written Documents Without 
Deference to the Trial Court 
In reviewing the interpretation of a written document, 
the appellate court need not defer to the trial court's determi-
nation. Gump and Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v. Domcoy Investorsr 
733 P.2d 128, 129 (Utah 1987); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 
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1149 (Utah 1986). Rather, the appellate court examines the writ-
ten document on its own to determine its meaning. 
The lease agreement between the parties is evidenced by 
at least four writings, all of which were before the trial court 
and are before this Court for de novo examination. The documents 
include (1) the Original Lease between Deshon Properties Corpora-
tion and General Motors Corporation, (2) the Sublease between 
General Motors and Sperry Rand Corporation, (3) the Attornment 
between Olds and Unisys, and (4) the letter from Unisys to Olds 
stating that Olds could waive restoration and accept all improve-
ments. This Court's examination of these documents and applica-
tion of the law of waiver and of course-of-performance will show 
Olds1 entitlement to waive the Restoration Clause and retain the 
improvements. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE 
PARTIES' UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESTORATION CLAUSE CONSTITUTES 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
On review, the appellate court should reverse a ruling 
if a trial court has excluded evidence in abuse of its discre-
tion. Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 
1977). In the case at bar, the trial court abused its discretion 
by excluding the evidence offered to prove the interpretation of 
the Sublease. 
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The exclusion of the additional evidence Olds sought to 
introduce precluded Olds' right to a fair hearing. Denial of a 
party's reasonable opportunity to introduce evidence in a hearing 
on an injunction requires reversal. Thus, the Fourth Circuit 
vacated a preliminary injunction in Consolidated Coal Co. v. Dis-
abled Miners of SW Virginia, 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1971), 
because the trial court did not allow the parties sufficient time 
to present their proof. See also Kohan v. Rimland School of 
Autistic Children, 430 N.E.2d 139 (111. App. 1981). 
By refusing to hear evidence of the common construction 
given to the Restoration Clause by both parties, the trial court 
abused its discretion. This Court should reverse and remand with 
directions to consider all the evidence of how the parties inter-
preted the Sublease. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS ERRONEOUS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE ATTORNMENT 
The Attornment provides that the Sublease shall be the 
primary lease between the Landlord and the Tenant, "provided, 
however, that those provisions of the prime lease which do not 
diminish Tenant's obligations or Landlord's rights under the sub-
lease shall be deemed incorporated into the sublease." Exhibit 
P-4. This proviso thus incorporates only pro-Landlord provisions 
of the Original Lease into the Sublease. 
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Section 10.02 of the Original Lease, entitling the Ten-
ant to remove any and all machinery, equipment and fixtures at 
the end of the lease, is a provision for the benefit of the Ten-
ant, since absent such a provision, under the common law, perma-
nently attached fixtures become part of the underlying realty. 
Ravi v. Shull Enterprises, 108 Idaho 524, 700 P.2d 567 (1984); 
Lienman v. Lienman, 201 Neb. 458, 268 N.W.2d 108 (1978); Van 
Kappel Company v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1183 (D.Md. 1971) 
(Missouri law). Section 10.02 permits the Tenant to remove per-
manently attached fixtures even if doing so would damage the 
building. Because this provision substantially diminishes the 
Landlord's rights, Section 10.02 does not survive the Attornment 
and is not incorporated into the Sublease. 
The trial court ignored, however, the selective incor-
poration principal of the Attornment. Rather, the court stated: 
"paragraph 10.02, I think its applicable." Tr.11-118. This 
holding directly contradicts the terms of the Attornment. 
The trial court's ruling did not mention the 
Attornment. Rather, the trial court stated that Section 10.02 
was incorporated into the Sublease based on the "subject to" lan-
guage of the Sublease. That clause simply states that the Sub-
lease is made "subject to all the terms and conditions of the 
underlying lease." Exhibit P-2, Addendum F. The court stated 
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that "subject to" means the "defendants are bound by the terms of 
the original lease, those that are of value to it as well as 
those that are value [sic] to the lessor." Tr.11-118. 
The trial court's analysis misconstrues the "subject 
to" language in the Sublease. The Sublease is made "subject to" 
the original lease in order to make clear that the sublessor may 
not grant the subtenant any more rights than the sublessor 
received in the original lease. Thus, all Subleases are made 
subject to the original lease. The "subject to" clause does not 
purport to incorporate the Original Lease into the Sublease. 
In any event, the Attornment is the most recent of the 
lease documents and therefore controls any contrary or conflict-
ing provisions in earlier documents. Only the Attornment deals 
with the issue of which provisions of the Original Lease are 
incorporated into the Sublease. The district court erred in 
ignoring the Attornment and applying paragraph 10.02 of the orig-
inal lease to the dispute. This error warrants reversal and an 
order granting the injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court misconstrued the Alteration 
Clause, the Restoration Clause, the mutual understanding of the 
parties, and the Attornment. The court also disallowed 
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introduction of critical evidence demonstrating the mutual under-
standing of the parties. 
WHEREFORE, appellant Olds Properties Corporation prays 
that the order of the District Court be vacated and the matter be 
remanded: 
1. With instructions to enter the injunction; or 
2. For a new hearing consistent with this Court's rul-
ing that: 
(a) Unisys has no right to alter the Prem-
ises without Olds1 permission, 
(b) Unisys established Olds1 right to waive 
the Restoration Clause by its letter of acknowledgement 
and Olds was therefore entitled to waive restoration of 
the Premises and to keep the improvements, 
(c) All course of performance evidence 
should be admitted, and 
(d) The Attornment superseded any right to 
remove fixtures contained in Section 10.02 of the Orig-
inal Lease. 
DATED this J± day of September, 1988. 
Warren Patten 
Michele Mitchell 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
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Arnold P. Messing 
Brian P. Rosman 
CSAPLAR & BOK 
One Winthrop Square 
Boston, Massachusetts 02110 
Of Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of September, 
1988 I caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant Olds Properties Corporation, to: 
Chris Wangsgard 
Thomas E. Nelson 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Mail Street, Suite 1600 «, 
MM:082588C 
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I M U T H O I N U S A *E> 4 70 
PREMISES 
, dated . .. D * C m b « r 2 D , 1972 
betweenCiai£R/L JM07P&S CQ&fQ&mOH. • D«t«v*r« Corporation, with 
principal oif lcea at J044 V«tt Crand fiaalevantf Dttroit* KUhlfcan 
W202 _ 
hereinafter called the Lessor, and - SPCRg? 1AHD C C S P O S A T I M (D&tYft? P U U i O F l ) 
Vto*t **Uln£ atSdraaa la P. 0. Box 500, l lu* tell, FaanayWaala 
L9422 
hereinafter called the Lessee, 
Witntzzttt): 
Lessor hereby lets to Lessee and Lessee hires from Lessor the following described premises 
Sea Exhibit MA" attachad barato acid cad* a part haraof. 
USE OF 
PREMISES 
RENT 
PAYMENT 
OF RENT 
REPAIRS 
COMPLIANCE 
* ITH REGU-
LATIONS 
to be used only for offleav warehousing and light manufacturing 
January 1, 1973 for the term commencing 
Decaabar 31, 1977* la th* avaat poaaaaaloa of * 
and expinnj 
of 
at the yearly ren 
WKSTT 01TC TBOUSAKD TVO KUXBRCD FIFTY and 00/100 DOLLARS ($91,2: 
4t7 604 17 
payable in equal or proportionate installments of • ' • 
Dollars in advance on thi 
first business day of each and every month during the term f a t c l a u a a t V a a t y * t h i r d §pa< 
raaarvad* 
PROVIDED ALWAYS, and Lessee hereby covenants as follows 
FIRST To pay the rent as aforesaid to Argonaut Realty Division of General Motors Corporation 
*it LLSJUL s lApcnsc to keep the premises in good repair, ordinary »car~a»4 tear< repair* 
to the roof, 1 NirniMnTTTn1 Imildmy jindjitructural repairs excepted, unless such repairs are made necessary 
by the act or negligence of the Lesseeand aTlhe ua^ura^ionof the term to remove its goods and effects and 
peaceably yield up the premises to the Lessor in as cnoiTTrmrTPnrm as itjinidrl ivrrrd to Lessee, ordinary 
wear and tear damage by fire the elements act of the public enemy or casultTry'lrxLepved^^llnotices tc 
quit or vacate being hereby expressly waived any law usage or custom to the eontrary notwithstanding 
THIRD To compK promptly w ith all laws ordinances requirements ind regulations of the Kdera 
State Count> Municipal and other authorities the fire insurance underwriters ind nn\ insurance or^in 
izations or associations* except that ijp-ooot.' ohall not be required to make an* «ilu*ra4»ons to Uu ^xUr4«r-o 
VIFWING 
PREMISES 
FOURTH To use the premises exclusively for the purpose set forth herein and during the last three 
months of this lea^ or any extension thereof to permit the lessor to display the usual To Let signs and 
to show the premise o to prospective tenants I e^sce further agrexs th it at any time during the term Lessor 
Lessor s landlord 01 tl ur agents ma> enter the premises for the purpose of examining the condition thereof, 
or to make repairs in n> part of the building but in making such reservation Lessor does not assume any 
fecW^f^lt^c wes^ TtfS'jfvicS^ «rcme^ ?0£.lBA'-iteil'\nSes<iptc of cocrcnccwr.t hci 
in, the recital r*Le for audi partial eouth ot occupancy a'jftli ba 
RIDER ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF SUBLEASE AGREEMENT DATED 
DECEMBER 20, 1972, BETWEEN GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, AS 
LESSOR, AND SPERRY RAND CORPORATION (UNIVAC DIVISION), AS 
LESSEE. 
TWENTIETH: Repairs - The Lessee at Lessee's expense 
shall keep the premises including the grounds, buildings, 
structures and improvements thereon in good order and con-
dition and shall make all repairs, replacements and improve-
ments required, structural or otherwise. The Lessee will 
at the expiration of this Lease, surrender and deliver said 
premises with the building and aforesaid improvements, 
appurtenances and equipment in good order and condition, 
reasonable wear and tear excepted. The Lessee agrees not 
to call upon the Lessor at any time during the term of 
this Lease to make any repairs or replacements of any part 
of the premises or improvements thereon, whether structural 
or otherwise, this being a Net Lease. The intention being that 
the rent received by the Lessor shall be free of any expense 
in connection with the care, maintenance, operation or repair 
of the premises or any improvements thereon. 
TWENTY-FIRST: Alterations - That Lessee will not make 
any alterations or add any construction whatsoever to the 
premises without the prior written consent of the Lessor, 
and in each instance, such a request for consent shall include 
a set of plans, specifications and cost of any contemplated 
improvement, and if the Lessee makes any alterations or adds 
any construction, such additional construction or alterations 
shall be removed at the expiration of the term and the premises 
shall be restored at the sole expense of the Lessee to the 
condition existing prior to Lessee's taking possession, except 
for improvements of the following nature which shall remain 
on the premises at the time Lessee vacates the premises: 
(1) Any additions, expansions, or alter-
ations to restrooms. 
(2) Changes in Interior layout to produce 
a cafeteria and lunchroom. 
(3) Heating and air conditioning units 
installed in the roof of the warehouse. 
(A) Any column mounted power distribution 
equipment or any main power feeds brought 
into the building. 
(5) Any fencing done to the property. 
(6) The Lessee may pave a portion of the 
"expansion area", located on the north 
side of the building. The Lessee must 
ADDENDUM A 
submit detailed plans and specifications 
for this paving, and the Lessor agrees 
to share in the cost of this paving on 
a 50/50 basis with its share not to ex-
ceed $8,000.00, payment to be made upon 
submission to the Lessor of paid invoices 
along with lien waivers from all sub-
contractors. 
TWENTY-SECOND: Insurance - Lessee shall maintain insurance 
with respect to the premises of the following types and In 
the following amounts: 
(a) Fire insurance with extended coverage 
in an amount not less than the full 
insurable value of the premises (ex-
cluding excavations and foundations). 
(b) Such insurance as will fully protect 
Lessor against damage caused by ex-
plosion of boilers, heating apparatus 
or other pressure vessels on the premises, 
such Insurance to afford protection to the 
limit of not less than Fifty Thousand Dol-
lars ($50,000.00). 
(c) Insurance covering public liability as 
will fully protect Lessor, and Lessee 
against claims of any and all persons 
for personal injury, death, or property 
damage occurring in or about the premises, 
or In or about any adjoining streets, 
sidewalks and passageways, such insurance 
to afford protection to the limit of not 
less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.00) for injury to one person and 
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) 
for Injury to more than one person in one 
accident, and Twenty-five Thousand Dollars 
($25,000.00) for damage to property. 
(d) Such other Insurance as will customarily 
be carried In times of International strife 
or war by owners and operators of similar 
property. 
Notwithstanding the limits for Insurance specified 
herein, Lessee agrees to Indemnify Lessor against all damage, 
loss or liability resulting from any of the rlsk6 referred to 
herein. 
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SPERRY CORPORATION 
WORLD H6A0OUARTERS 
BLUE BELL PENNSYLVANIA 19424-0001 
TELEPHONE (215) 542-4011 
October 27, 1986 
John H. 0, LaGatta 
Olds & Co • , Inc. 
595 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
Re: Sperry Leased Facility 
845 North Overland Drive 
Morth Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. LaGatta: 
Sorry for the delay in responding to your most recent 
correspondence; however, I was waiting for legal counsel to 
review our sublease agreement. 
According to counsel, Sperry is obligated to complete tne 
restoration of the facility in accordance with the provisions 
of the restoration paragraph unless you as landlord waive this 
right. It is also their opinion that the restoration should be 
completed by the end of the lease term, can be started at any 
time, and landlord consent is not required. With regard to 
landlord's right to waive, it is limited to waiving of the 
entire clause. 
Sperry is planning to move the current manufacturing operation 
from this location to their main site in Salt Lake city. Plans 
are to have the move completed by April, 1987. At the present 
time we are evaluating the facility and trying to determine how 
best to eliminate or substantially reduce our remaining rental 
obligation. At the present time, Sperry is considering two 
options: (1) Retain real estate brokerage firm and market the 
property as an ongoing manufacturing facility. This, however, 
will require landlord to waive Sperry's restoration obligations 
and provide suitable leasing terms beyond the current lease. 
(2) Utilize the facility for remote storage or sublease as 
storage space and commence restoration obligations in 
accordance with ongoing needs of the facility. 
; order to proceed with one or the other, it would be helpful 
if you could establish your position on the restoration clause, 
i.e., do you want Sperry to restore in accordance with the 
provisions of that clause or are you willing to waive that 
paragraph and accept all the improvements provided by Sperry. 
If you are agreeable to the latter, it seems to me that we 
could enter into an agreement with a real estate broker so that 
they could market the property on a long term basis. 
ADDENDUM B 
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With regard to your inquiry relative to properties Sperry might 
consider a sale/leaseback, at the present time there are no 
earmarked for a sale/leaseback. If any 
lowever, it is unlikely that we would 
consider your firm until we have a satisfactory resolution of 
the North Salt Lake City facility. 
properties that are 
become available, he 
Very truly yours, 
- , / -' •?' S-^ 
E. H. Maguire -
Manager 
Real Estate 
EHM/kmm 
ADDENDUM B 
'"II m r-\ it 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
O JAN 27 AH 10 37 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTftiCTre6UR*:!Vl{-9^^K 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
OLDS PROPERTIES CORPORATION, ) 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
UNISYS, a Delaware ) 
corporation, a successor in ] 
interest of SPERRY-RAND ] 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, and JOHN 
DOES I - X, I 
Defendants. ! 
BE IT REMEMBERED thai 
the above-entitled matter came 
Judicial District Court in and 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. 41895 
t on Monday, September 28, 1987, 
on for HEARING in the Second 
for Davis County, State of 
Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Presiding. 
1 * • 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the plaintiff: 
For the defendants: 
* * 1 
DAVID 0. BLACK 
Attorney at Law 
1245 Brickyard Road 
Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
CHRIS P. WANGSGARD 
Attorney at Law 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah .84145 1 
Nancy H. Davis, C.S.R. COKTEKTS NOT FILMED 
MR. BLACK: Well, I will not—we will use them to 
the extent that they are before the Court on the Motion to 
Dismiss, although I have a difficult time understanding how 
the Motion to Dismiss can include information that goes beyond 
the bounds of the pleadings without it becoming a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and, therefore, if it becomes a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, I would object to them based upon the fact 
that they are hearsay and I have not had a chance to cross-
examine the affiants or voir dire them in connection with 
those documents, so, I object to them being before the Court 
on the basis of a Motion to Dismiss because they are clearly 
inappropriate for a Motion to Dismiss. 
MR. WANGSGARD: Well, they are proffered as business 
records and I have alleged foundation. 
THE COURT: The Court overrules any objection for 
purposes of the Motion to Dismiss just as for the Summary 
Judgment, they are appropriate and they can be responded to by 
opposing affidavits if a person wants to. Go ahead. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Mr. LaGatta, I show you what has 
been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Would you identify that 
document? 
A Yes. This is a letter from Mr. Maguire of Unisys to 
me dated October 27, 1986. 
Q Have you reviewed that letter? 
A Yes. 
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Q And was that letter caused to be retrieved from you 
by your business records? 
A It indeed was. It's this one. 
MR. BLACK: Move for its admission of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 6. 
MR. WANGSGARD: No objection. 
THE COURT: It may be admitted. 
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 6, previously 
marked for identification, 
was received into evidence.) 
Q (By Mr. Black) Calling your attention to the final 
paragraph on Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, if I might give the 
Court a copy of that exhibit. 
THE COURT: I already have one, It's part of the 
things we were just talking about, isn't it? Here. Keep that 
one. I am using the one that is part of the affidavit of 
Edward Maguire. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Calling your attention to the final 
paragraph on the first page of that exhibit, did you have a 
discussion or does the final paragraph of that exhibit refer 
to the restoration clauses of the sublease that is Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2? 
MR. WANGSGARD: I am going to have to object. I may 
not understand the question, but it seems to be a question 
that this paragraph of the exhibit speaks for itself. 
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THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
MR. BLACK: I would like to read it into the record, 
what it states, and then I will ask Mr. LaGatta what caused 
the conversation or the negotiations that are a topic of that 
paragraph, if I might. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BLACK: "In order to proceed with one or the 
other, it would be helpful if you could establish your 
position on the restoration clause, i.e., do you want Sperry 
to restore in accordance with the provisions of that clause or 
are you willing to waive that paragraph and accept all the 
improvements provided by Sperry. If you are agreeable to the 
latter, it seems to me that we could enter into an agreement 
with a real estate broker so that they could market the 
property on a long term basis." 
MR. WANGSGARD: I don't know where you are. I don't 
think you are in the exhibit. 
MR. BLACK: Right there at the bottom. 
MR. WANGSGARD: Oh, okay. 
Q (By Mr. Black) That paragraph refers to a 
restoration clause. What restoration clause is it referring 
to? 
A That would, of course, be the restoration clause in 
the sublease which had become the lease because the other 
lease, the prime lease, was made out of the exhibits. 
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MR. WANGSGARD: Objection. Foundation. Move the 
2 answer be stricken. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. The answer may 
I 
4 be stricken. Proffering information and it's going beyond the 
e question asked. 
6 MR. BLACK: I'm sorry. What was your objection 
n based upon? I missed that. I was thinking of— 
8 MR. WANGSGARD: I move the answer be stricken. 
g MR. BLACK: Ask if I could have his objection read, 
Xo if ! might. 
H (Whereupon, Mr. Wangsgard's objection was read 
X2 by the Court Reporter.) 
13 Q (By Mr. Black) And I call your attention to the 
14 restoration language in Paragraph—the final paragraph of 
15 Exhibit 7 that is before you. 
13 MR. WANGSGARD: Counsel, first of all, I think you 
17 are not talking about the final paragraph of Exhibit 7 and— 
18 MR. BLACK: The final paragraph on the first page of 
19 Exhibit 6. 
20 Q (By Mr. Black) I call your attention to the 
21 language referring to the restoration clause. What 
22 restoration clause, if you know, was being discussed in this 
23 letter? 
24 MR. WANGSGARD: Objection. The document speaks for 
25 itself. 
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THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, I submit the document 
doesn't speak for itself because there can be many restoration 
clauses and that document does not specifically refer to a 
restoration clause. 
MR. WANGSGARD: But, this document has to speak for 
itself because what he is purporting to do is to have 
Mr. LaGatta tell the Court what another person intended when 
they used those words in this letter. That's why the letter 
needs to speak for itself and we shouldn't have other 
witnesses trying to explain what somebody else meant. 
MR. BLACK: Why don't I rephrase the question. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Mr. LaGatta, had you previously had 
discussions with Mr. Maguire regarding the restoration clause 
referred to on the last paragraph of the first page of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7? 
A Yes. 
Q And would you recount to the Court in general, the 
terms of those discussions, if you can, date of the 
discussions and where you had them with Mr. Maguire. 
MR. WANGSGARD: Just a second. Objection. 
Immaterial. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. We seem to be 
now talking about what the negotiations are between the 
parties; are we not? 
ADDENDUM C 
58 
^
w
^ u t t h e c-vjuLiati^i ^ : ncr ^ c u t i t - b ~ . . ^ s e q u e n t t * en t e n i 
* ho ^ n t r a c t r o a a r d i n u what thf- r ^ s t n r ^ ; < ^ n ' . ' S P *n^  ^ 
n t e r p r e t a t i c : . _i I ' a i a< j ra | -^ __ _ i t h e ~ ~ i j l e a s e i s c o n c e r n e d 
w
" WAMGSGARD: I t ' s i m m a t e r i a l - ' e s s ^ \ > \ a r e 
u n l e s s t h e y *: • : i a i n i i n c r n a t th i y -*fta -:e - : o o s : * 
•? mdKt any :-~*r>-^* ... 
answer t ; ^ 1 - yop-r Rnnr>r 
, i n c - ' ,a* * : + : \ t t r r r e t i t i o n o l a c e d . » '* • r,a* c : 
<^ <* ^ r^rr:e^ 4"- . we uwii' L j j e l i e v r - \ * 
f p a r o l e e v i d e n c e : * , , , ' nv ^
 x * 
c n t e m p o r a n e o u ^ w > * \ * *^  ' r a n s a c i c r wr PJ, : • was • * ^ e r - r , 
: a i \ V * • h " * : r - — - •
 ; *. 
20 
numerous o c c a s i c i . , , ' . ^ . i.ai . i-^ ^ .;,*--•; i+- ^ 
- o n s * r u c t : :it e r c - r e t a t i c ; ! t r , .-urn* i s , *h.,*t t h e 
?1 ^ p . s t r u c t : ^ ' ' f " r r r - ^ i t * UiaL w i n DL 
23 
24 
.• 3 c a s e s ^ n ' 
THE COURT: Nr*. ^eu i v . n ' t h o n e s t I t e n i e t h e 
p a r t i e s ac~-'-i~ . - -
- ^cp can v u u ' 
59 
* MR. BLACK: I think that we can because I think 
2 there's additional correspondence. 
2 THE COURT: Let me ask counsel. Is he speaking for 
4 you? 
5 MR. WANGSGARD: He certainly is not, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: I know he can't be speaking for him 
7 because I read the documents, too. 
g MR. BLACK: I think this shows that the parties had 
g an understanding of what the agreement was. 
IQ\ MR. WANGSGARD: It's just immaterial. 
H THE COURT: The Court will sustain the objection. 
12 Q (By Mr. Black) I hand you what has been marked as 
13 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7. Would you please identify that 
14 document. 
15 MR. WANGSGARD: May I see what you are talking 
lg about, please? 
17 THE COURT: What are you talking about so the Court 
18 can refer to it? 
19 MR. BLACK: I will give the Court a copy in just a 
20 second. 
21 THE COURT: That's not what I already have? 
22 MR. BLACK: That's correct. 
23 Q (By Mr. Black) Would you identify that document, 
24 please. 
25 A Yes. This is a Unisys—Mr. Maguire's letter of 
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21 documor *- T e a k ? t - -~^ •• Any wt:*ua. proceeding is improper 
2 2 a i I :i . . . _, i i ill y : t je • : !:: it : • 
23 MR. BLACK: Apparently P : is bt.- - stipulated t • ;? 
24 admission. 
25 : Okay. I t may be adini t t e d on 
u. 
stipulation. 
Q 
series of 
(By 
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 7, having 
previously been marked for 
identification, was 
received into evidence.) 
Mr. Black) Mr. LaGatta, you indicated you had a 
conversations with Mr. Maguire involving 
negotiations ] regarding 
is that correct? 
A 
Q 
waiver of 
A 
Q 
Resl 
Had 
toration, 
Mr. Magu 
restoration 
Yes 
And did he t 
restoration under the 
A 
believed « 
Yes 
MR. 
f the restoration clause of the sublease; 
maintenance and many other things. 
lire discussed previously with you the 
under the sublease? 
>elieve it was your right to waive 
sublease? 
WANGSGARD: Objection as to what Mr. Maguire 
and move the 
THE 
the answer. 
Q (By 
COURT: 
Mr. Blac 
Properties could waive 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
answer be stricken. 
Sustain the objection. We will strike 
:k) Did he state to you that Olds 
the restoration clause of the sublease? 
WANGSGARD: Objection. Immaterial. 
COURT: 
BLACK: 
Sustain the objection. 
Immaterial to whether they thought that 
they could waive restoration? That's the precise issue before 
ADDENDUM C 62 
In : COURT: T U r t - r ' ? : 4 - " 4 - , ~ — ^ ^ u c p r e c i s e 
i s s u e h e f ' T ^ * WJ • <rf --'* i*- '**-• - i r ? n i n r - , s p p n d i r ^ ' 
f o ] e c t e c t o t ' l i s wncJc ; r o c e e d - n a n e c a u s e \ e was : f r a i - • * * 
P 1 "* *' * ' e'"a s e v;-< r * 
it. r.r L 
8 * *vTiy f ' ^ C m r t :uar.t - i n t e r p r e t * *. </ r t a r - a y ana 
^ I we d i e i ' 1 1 ; " ^ ' h e Coal t ^ * ' *~ * : e r : " , n 7 be : • 1 
10 +-he i n t e r p r c L a t *-. - , a r ^ r e _ . . ,_ , d e c i d e 
111 * h a t t h e T i q i n a l t r a n s a c t i o n . r o u . : » i , v( . s e e . Fha : . t h 
121 I i m e 
14 BLACK .nder s ran*: v jr c o n c o r : ;M;I 
1 5 • ' 
16 t a k e a f i w - i i ^L i t - r eoe^ jb . 
17 (Whereupc* r* rectus *d:- * .ken.) 
18 Q , 
19 been marked a^> Piju.t i: : ' - L^L.M* .V ^ , .rase 
20 identify that document, 
21 A 
22 Q
 vVdb that uuiu^ii icirieved from, your business 
23 records as you previously described you maintain them? 
2 4
 A 1 es. 
2 5
 • Q Who is I t from? 
ADDENDUM I" 
THIS LEASE, Bade thia 16th j
 fty • \ March f 1964, 
between DESHON FROPEXTT CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, 
having i i in, ©filet in cara of Tha Prentice-Hall Corporation Systes, 
Inc.,. 22/9 South Stata Straat, Dover, Dalavara (harain callad tha 
1*saern) iiiioiKl UEHE1AL MOTORS CORPORATIL a Baleware Corporation, 
having ita principal offica at 3044 West Gran I Bot .1 it i: i I, Detroit, 
Michigan 48202 (harain callad tha l|ri L a a a a a I , ! ) 9 
U *
 H « i S I "X" 1: 
Lastor laaaaa to Laaaaa, and Leasee hires from Lassor, 
for tha ten, Mt tha rental, and subjact to tha provisions hara-
in sat forth, ALL THAT CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAHD described in 
EXHIBIT A annexed hereto and _ — * ^ urt -hereof* 
Together with all and singular tha building! ixiii I ap-
provements, water, watercourses and riparian rights connected 
therewith, privileges and advantages, with the appurtenances to 
tht finis belonging or in anywise appertaining, m tct than ^  :l i in-
cluded in the within letting any and all interest in and to tha 
sidewelkt. curbs, ± any), and public street or streets 
i ncerest acquired - i the 
i ' arty to . Jit 
ticJe nhicj i by the I0HN 
T. K.OTR. 
ADDENDUM D i • 
PLAINTIFF 
EXHIBIT 
L 
"1 
1 
Section 10,02, It is understood and agreed that the 
Lessee| from time to time during the term of this Lease or any 
extension thereof, suiy install machinery, equipment and fix* . 
tures of various kinds and description for the purpose of 
carrying on ita business, and upon any of such machinery, 
equipment and fixtures being so installed in or pieced on the 
leased premises by the Lessee the same shall remain at all 
times the property of the Lessee, and, at any time during the 
term or any extension or extensions thereof and at the termin-
ation of the Lease or any extension or extensions thereof, the 
Lessee shall be entitled to remove any and all of such machin-
ery, equipment and fixtures; provided, however, that if any 
machinery and equipment is so attached to any building or 
buildings so as not to be readily removable without damage to 
the building or buildings, then, in such event, if the Lessee 
shell remove the same, the Lessee shell promptly repeir and • 
replace any damage caused to the building or buildings by 
such removal. If the Lessee shall exercise its right to re- i 
new this Lease beyond the initial term for any extended term! 
or terms it shall not be necessary for the Lessee to reserve 
its right to such machinery, equipment and fixtures or their 
removal. 
ADDENDUM D 
D E C l . ? . . " . ^ - •••J----^-"i W CAROL L)E.--, »G2 -ccoroer 2 a \ ; - v 
TENANT ESTOPPEL CERTIFICA.r: .. .-.:.. - :i~kJK:i:.i 
_ ^ ,, 
690522 
. \*- undersigned, as tenant . -r+.ir.* ...... 
>.c: .din sublease ("Sublease") dated December 2C 13*" 2 ;n 1 :e 
with General Motors Corporaticn ( "CM" ) , as landlord (GM 1—; 
success::. \ :; 1:3 interest in the Sublease being 
wetndlora"), does hereby certify t: andl- :3 and Prime 1-na-
lord (as defined h^ *-^ -» *-- ~~+-Qr- * 
1- .;:e Sublease (^ s the same m^y have been amented, 
modifier :r supplemented) is m full force ana effect a m 
consists :: the documents set forth on Exhibit A hereto and 
covers ~nhe premises (the "Premises"' iescribed :?. Exhibit 3 
hei-r: . Exhibit A also sets forth any consents given by 
either part, *:;y material actions for which such ccns-^ 
- was required .r;aer the Sublease and --11 documents cr a;:1 
ments regarding any hypotheca*^ :r '-'• assignment of Tenan' s 
interest :n ir.e Sublease 
2. The _ _.-j:.e^ement ^a .- -. tne Nuclease is T? .uarv 1, 
"o T3 1973, and t;>- ;urrent -exoiraticn date thereof cursuar.t t*. *:.--
x — ame~T.m^r~ -escribe:! in Exhibit A here": . .~ March Tl 1^8C 
~~ • he :.*b*.ease ;:ai _wU *ie mrtner 
"1 To the best of Tenant's knowledge, there is 1 10 
.£ ~ monetary or material breach under the Sublease, whether on the 
i' Zz part of Landlord or Tenant. 
c_ ^ «•.. _db not sublet or granted any license of any 
0 CJJ portion -: a.l -1 M e ;remises, except as follows NCNE 
rer.ta. -expenditures of Landlord reiniD'it iw»le 
-y ^xm.;. has been prepaid before its due date under the 
Sublease and all such rental ^~< expenditures have been paid 
mr:ugh :~tob*a 
-
i
*'" ' - let 0.3 I 'I iniJei 'Le jut lease, 
8. - - .emises nave ceen repaired and maintained in 
c^mpiiar - *;th the Sublease, and to the best of Tenant's 
knowledge tne:e . * . structural or material defect in the 
Pre- -<=^  
j
 Tenant has received no notice from any government ,ij 
authority . the effect that the Premises and or Tenant's use 
thereof is unlawful. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
^ - I 
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10. To the best of Tenant's knowledge, there is no 
threatened or actual action or proceeding against the Premises, 
including, without limitation, any action or proceeding relating 
to zoning, environmental, eminent domain or condemnation matters 
(except the current Charlotte condemnation proceeding). 
11. That Tenant has received a copy of that certain 
Lease, to which the Sublease is subject, (the "Prime Lease") 
dated March 16, 1964, between Deshon Property Corporation, as 
prime landlord (Desho|i Property Corporation or any successor-in-
interest to, or designee of, Deshcn Property Corporation, being 
hereinafter referred to as "Prime Landlord") and General Motors 
Corporation, as prime tenant. 
12. If the Prime Lease shall be assigned, surrendered 
or otherwise transferred to the Prime Landlord, then effective 
simultaneously with such assignment, surrender or other transfer, 
and without any further act of any other person, Tenant shall be 
deemed to have attorned to the Prime Landlord upon Prime 
Landlord's acceptance thereof as hereinafter provided and the 
Sublease shall continue as a lease between Prime Landlord, as 
lessor, and Tenant, as lessee, containing the same terms and 
conditions of the Sublease; provided, however, that those provi-
sions of the Prime Lease which do not diminish Tenant's obliga-
tions or Landlord's rights under the Sublease shall be deemed 
incorporated into the Sublease. The foregoing provisions of this 
paragraph shall (a) inure to the benefit of any Prime Landlord, 
(b) apply notwithstanding that, as a matter of law, the Sublease 
may terminate upon the assignment, surrender or other termination 
of the Prime Lease, and (c) no further instrument shall be 
required to give effect to said provisions. Upon demand of Prime 
Landlord, Tenant agrees, however, to execute, from time to time, 
instruments in confirmation of the foregoing provisions of this 
paragraph reasonably satisfactory to Prime Landlord, in which 
Tenant shall acknowledge such attornment and shall set forth the 
terms and conditions of its tenancy. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Tenant has caused this instrument to 
be signed in its corporate name by Richard T,. Seaberg , its 
President, whose signature has been attested to 
by girharri J. Marchek , its (Assistant) Secretary, 
this y day of y^i>. ^ /-^ •_ , 1984. 
ATTEST: SPERRY CORPORATION* 
(Assistant) Secretary ~ President 
Defense Products Cfroup 
^Formerly Sperry Rand Corporation; name change effective Aug. 1, 19' 
•A rM-M-ivrTvTTAA T? 
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IM LITHO IN U.S * REV *-70 
PREMISES 
ZW Sublease t dated . . . .DfcCMbf lr 1 0 - , 1971 , 
b e t w e e n G E K m . . ) ! ^ I f t t h 
p::i : l o ei pili ofIlcea...at..3A44...V*tt..firAi»l..AHil«Mrdf I M1. to 1,1, MU.fei.tf.tt... 
4 « 2 0 2 . _ _ .- . 
hereinafter called the Lessor, and I P O t H Y 1 M B C O ^ ^ 
Vka9.t..jM.tUBC.«4dr«as ! • ff...O...Jto. J ^ 
UA22 _ „ 
hereinafter called the I essee, 
Ij^mn bcrpln U-is to Lessee and l-w^see • **s iiurn l-«r**>r the following described premises: 
$m i x h i b l i 'A atUchttd bcr«>. I ill lie it:: i in lie 11 isi f i 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
JZ 
J£L 25: 
use or 
PREMISES 
RENT 
PAYMENT 
OF RENT 
REPAIRS 
COMPLIANCE 
WITH REGU-
LATIONS 
VIEWING 
PREMISES 
£c#. varaboutLiig atid Light manufacturing 
I* JM" 1 > ." .~. ..7T .„. _.. , 
January l» 1973 , 
•. * ftm < omi T •" c-"
 t :** " and expiring 
* \\ "la th« avant poaaaaaioa of • 
:. a t the yearly rent 
HZ TOOBSAKD TWO KUXORSO FIFTY *od 00/100 0OLLAIS ($91,25< 
payable in equal or proportionate installments of *.*..•.?fV.„.?.*... 
Dollars in advance on the 
first: business day of each and every month during the term. I t * clauaa tvaaty- t h i r d AfMic 
raaarvad* 
P R O V I D E D AI WAYS, and I essee hereby covenants as. follows: 
F I R S T : To pay the rent, as aforesaid to A rgonaut Realty Division of General Motors Corporation 
mpmii m j» • ' r iiji'o jjiii t 'f! Lrp#'iri t h i i r f^ ii''#iwwii»aiiiii<ii<Bi «if* \m\\Sfkd^fm fii"" c m a if ifs-if f i i ••* ** •»* * %.* ».«***•» *% w\jri #• **.*%.*» ^jtjxr%f%. xXJLm 
to the roof, exterior oTTnT1 UuiUko&jma^structural repairs excepted, unless such repairs are made necessary 
by the act or negligence of the Lessee aruTaTThc ej^aiia^ionof the term to remove its goods and effects and 
* ably yield up the premises to the Lessor in as good rnnTTTTrrm as Ttjfcu^TdrlivrTrd to Lessee, ordinary 
ind tear, damage by fire, the elements, act of the public enemy or casualTy"!** i r\ >U'iL,ajlnotice» to 
tuit or vacate being hereby c.Mpre»iy~^wm^ to the eontittfy-nuiwiihsiSiRI 
T H I R D : To comply promptly with all laws, ordinances, requirements and reputations of the Federal, 
State , County, Municipal and other authorities, the fire insurance underwriters, and any insurance organ-
izations or associations* except that ijfrooti* ohalJ not be f4/qyir«i44»~«al^^-^^ 
^ ft 1 tOri 3 Of '"I 
F O U R T H : To use the premises exclusively for the purpose set forth herein and during the last three 
months of this lease, or any extension thereof, to permit the Lessor to display the usual "To Let" signs and 
to show the premises to prospective tenants. Lessee further agrees th.it at any time during the term Lessor, 
Lessor's landlord, or their agents, may enter the premises for the purpose of examining the condition thereof, 
or to make repairs in any part of the building, but in making such reservation, Lessor does not assume any 
fc^'^^iikTCc2 ^t-^s^nfijsio/v^be i^r^i^ o£Su^i(eOT«sda te of cocrcericec^rct her 
: , the reci tal r*?.e fvt n icb p a r t i a l cou th of occupaacy a!-all b t 
NOTICES F IFTEENTH : That all notices to be eiven hereunder by either partv shall be in writing and gi 
by personal delivery to the Lesse e/(£?£enWfq»<? exeS&We £§&&& Jfel&&§Por shall be sent 
telegram or by registered mail addressed to the party intended to be notified at the post office addi 
of such party last known to the party giving such notice and notice given as aforesaid shall be a si 
cient service thereof. Provided, however, that it is mutually agreed that the Lessor appoints 
Executive in Charge of Real Estate and the Manager and the Director, Real Estate Department 
Argonaut Realty Division, General Motors Corporation, 485 West Milwaukee, Detroit, Michigan 48 
as its agents and that any one of them may give all notices and receive all notices to be given h 
under, and may receive the rent, and notices shall be sent to any one of said agents and not otherw 
The right is hereby reserved by the Lessor to countermand such appointments and make others c 
sistent herewith, due notice of which shall be given by the Lessor to the Lessee. 
TERMINATION SIXTEENTH: If at any time proceedings in bankruptcy, or pursuant to any other act for 
relief of debtors, shall be instituted by or against Lessee, or if Lessee shall compound Lessee's debt1 
assign over Lessee's estate or effects for payment thereof, or if any execution shall issue against Lei 
or any of Lesse^c effects whatsoever, or if a receiver or trustee shall be appointed of Lessee's prope 
or if this lease shall by operation of law, devolve upon or pass to any person or persons other t 
Lessee personally, then and in each of said cases, Lessor may terminate this lease forthwith by nol 
ing Lessee as herein provided. Upon such termination all sums due and payable or to become due 
payable by Lessee shall at once become due and payable. 
SUBLEASE S E V E N T E E N T H : This is a sublease and the Lessor's interest in the premises is as Lessee w 
an underlying lease made by.DeS.hoH..P.rop.eX.ty. .CO.rp.OratiO.U>...fift..l.e.$.8.Qr^...ftn4_ 
General Motors Corporation,.as.. Lessee , dated March.lfi.f....L9.fiL4 
copy of which, initialed for identification, is attached hereto. This sublease is expressly made subjei 
all the terms and conditions of said underlying lease and the Lessee agrees to use the premises ir 
cordance with the terms of said underlying lease and not do or omit to do anything which will br 
any of the terms thereof. If said underlying lease is terminated, this sublease shall terminate si 
taneously and any unearned rent paid in advance shall be refunded to the Lessee, provided that s 
termination is not the result of a breach by Lessee of the within sublease. 
E I G H T E E N T H : Lessor hereby covenants that Lessee upon paying the rent as herein rese 
and performing all the covenants and agreements herein contained on the part of the Lessee may qu 
enjoy the premises, except as herein otherwise provided, and subject, however, to the terms of the 1 
to Lessor, and to the terms of any mortgages which may now or hereafter affect the premises. 
N I N E T E E N T H : The Lessor and the Lessee waive all rights, each against the other, 
damages caused by fire or other perils covered by insurance where such damages are sustained in 
nection with the occupancy of the leased premises. 
FOR ADDITIONAL CLAUSES SEE RIDER ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A 
PART HEREOF. 
QUIET 
POSSESSION 
ADDENDUM F 
